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Background Theview thatmost
militarypersonnel evacuated fromwar
zones are suffering fromcombat stress
reactions, or are otherwise traumatised
by the horrors of war, has animpacton all
aspects ofmilitarypsychiatry.
Aims To delineate the reasons for
psychiatric aeromedical evacuation from
Iraqfromthe startof build-up ofUKforces
in January 2003 until the end of October
that year, 6 months after the end of formal
hostilities.
Method Aretrospective studywas
conducted of field and in-patient
psychiatric assessments of116 military
personnel evacuated to the UKmilitary




proportionwere inreserve service (21%)
andhad a historyof contactwithmental
health services (37%).Only 3% had a
combat stress reaction.In over 85% of
cases evacuationwas for lowmood
attributed to separation fromfriends or
family, ordifficulties adjusting to the
environment.
Conclusions These findings have
implications especially for screening for
suitability fordeployment, and for
understandinganylonger-termmental
health problems arising inveterans from
Iraq.
Declaration of interest None.
The recent claim against the UK Ministry of
Defence for failing to prevent, detect and
treat psychiatric injury in veterans of mili-
tary action in Northern Ireland, the Falk-
lands, the Persian Gulf and Bosnia was
lost in all significant respects (Multiple
Claimants v. The Ministry of Defence,
2003). Furthermore, in a climate in which
it is increasingly accepted that ‘Gulf War
syndrome’ is as much a product of culture
as of war (Wessely, 2001), the compensa-
tion bid by veterans of the first Persian Gulf
War also failed (Dyer, 2004). The way is
now clear for an assessment of the psycho-
logical consequences of the ongoing conflict
in Iraq that is not blurred by either a failure
to recognise that contemporary post-
combat psychosomatic syndromes are ‘old
wine in new bottles’ (Wessely, 1990), or a
mistaken belief that the mental health
requirements of military veterans are
systematically neglected. Unfortunately,
we have already been subjected to mislead-
ing reports about the psychiatric casualties
from Iraq (Kite & Rayment, 2004), which,
if unchallenged, may lead to yet another
round of misattributions.
METHOD
Data on all military psychiatric casualties
from combat zones are routinely recorded
at the receiving military hospital in the
UK. This study was a retrospective analysis
of these case-note data. Data were analysed
in three phases:
(a) from 16 January 2003 (when the first
psychiatric evacuee presented) until 20
March 2003 (when the war began);
(b) from 20 March 2003 until 5 May 2003
(when formal hostilities ended);
(c) from 5 May 2003 until 30 October
2003 (representing the 6-month post-
war period).
Data were not collected on the
population presenting with psychiatric
symptoms in the theatre of war who were
not evacuated, or on those who were evacu-
ated but discharged at the UK airhead.
Statistical analysis was conducted using
Pearson’s chi-squared test for significant
differences (P50.05) between categorically
grouped independent samples.
RESULTS
British military casualties were returned
from the conflict in Iraq by aeromedical
evacuation. Between 16 January 2003 and
30 October 2003 there were 2009 such
evacuations. Of these, 178 evacuations were
primarily for psychiatric reasons; the ratio of
psychiatric to medical evacuations was there-
fore 1:10. Personnel evacuated for psychi-
atric reasons arrived at RAF Brize Norton
in the UK and 61 of them were sufficiently
well to be immediately discharged back to
their unit from the airhead. The remaining
117 were admitted to the Duchess of Kent’s
Psychiatric Hospital (DKPH) in Catterick
Garrison. Data were available in 116 of
these cases, representing 99% of the total
population admitted to the DKPH. The char-
acteristics of the sample were as follows: 101
(87%) were men; the mean age of the sample
was 28.2 years (range 18–55) and 47 (40%)
were married. The majority (n¼79; 68%)
served in the Army; 19 (16%) were in the
Royal Air Force (RAF), 18 (16%) in the
Royal Navy and 24 (21%) were Reservists
(Territorial Army, RAF Auxiliary or Naval
Auxiliary). Forty-three (37%) had a history
of having seen a psychiatrist or a community
psychiatric nurse.
Figure 1 shows the rates of evacuation
every 2 weeks from the time of the first
psychiatric evacuation on 16 January
2003 until 30 October 2003, 6 months
after formal hostilities ended. The numbers
of people in the sample evacuated during
the pre-war, war and post-war phases of
the military operation were 30 (26%), 51
(44%) and 36 (31%) respectively. Table 1
shows the findings relating to the war role
of those evacuated, their psychiatric symp-
toms, their reasons for distress and evacu-
ation and the ICD–10 disorder (World
Health Organization, 1992) diagnosed in
the UK. There were 32 combatants from
infantry or tank regiments, only 13 of
whom (11% of the sample) presented to a
community psychiatric nurse in the field.
The remaining 19, along with 58 others
(two-thirds of the sample) presented to a
field hospital. Nine (8%) Naval personnel
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presented at sea. There was a significant
difference (P50.05) between the distribu-
tion of causes of evacuation between the
three phases of the conflict, with an
increased rate of environmental and
combat causes and a decreased rate of
interpersonal causes during the war phase
(w2¼16.51, d.f.¼8, P¼0.04).
DISCUSSION
The demographic and military characteris-
tics of personnel evacuated were consistent
with the military requirements of a ground
war. Most of them were male and in the
army. However, it is interesting, in terms
of vulnerability, that the mean age of evac-
uees was relatively high (28.2 years), that
21% were Reservists, 40% were married
and 37% had a history of having required
a consultation with a mental health pro-
fessional. In general, older troops are likely
to be less physically resilient, and Reservists
and married troops may have allegiances
outside the service that interfere with mili-
tary cohesion. These characteristics fit with
the more general finding that the vast
majority of evacuees were from support
units and not combat units. Our findings
are also consistent with those of McAllister
et al (2004), who reported that most of the
referrals to their field mental health team in
Iraq were of support troops and that there
was bias towards Reservists. Remarkably,
given the media perception of Iraq and our
finding that there was a dramatic and sus-
tained reduction in the rate of evacuations
precisely after the war ended, only four indi-
viduals attributed their symptoms to combat.
Instead, over 78% of those evacuated
presented in theatre with low mood and
almost all of these cited difficulties coping
with the physical environment and separa-
tion from family and/or partners as the cause
of their symptoms. Only two individuals
developed symptoms of serious mental illness
and 30% of cases were felt not to fulfil the cri-
teria for any ICD–10 diagnosis. Accordingly,
the mean stay in hospital in the UK was brief,
at 1.4 days. Although half of the sample were
given a diagnosis of adjustment disorder, with
the benefit of hindsight psychiatrists responsi-
ble for the initial assessments in the UK felt
that the distinction between the ‘adjustment
disorder’ and ‘no diagnosis’ groups was an
artefact resulting from confusion about
whether to base diagnoses on presentation
in theatre or presentation in the UK. Since
all cases were symptomatic in theatre and
most were asymptomatic when the individual
returned to the UK, our results imply a slight
preference for basing diagnosis in the UK on
presentation in theatre.
Combat stress and nostalgia
It is easy to assume, as some elements of the
media appear to have done in relation to
Iraq (Kite & Rayment, 2004), that all mili-
tary psychiatric casualties arising during a
conflict will be suffering from acute stress
reaction caused by the trauma of battle,
otherwise known as combat stress reaction.
This, however, is not the case. Combat
troops fighting in the low-intensity conflicts
that characterise modern warfare, and
support troops in any conflict, are not often
exposed to the kind of acute, overwhelming
stress that is necessary for the symptoms of
combat stress reaction to develop. Instead,
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Fig.1 Rate of psychiatric evacuationsbefore, during and after thewar in Iraq: 2-week periods from16 January
2003 to 30 October 2003.
Table1 Military personnel evacuated as
psychiatric casualties: trades, causes of distress,







Catering staff 8 (6.9)
Medical staff 8 (6.9)
Police 3 (2.6)
Bomb disposal 2 (1.7)
Naval officer 2 (1.7)
Total non-combatants 84 (72.4)
Combatants
Infantry/tank regiments 32 (27.6)
Total combatants 32 (27.6)





None identified 17 (14.7)
Primarypresenting symptom in theatre
Lowmood 91 (78.4)
Anxiety 14 (12.0)
Somatic symptoms 4 (3.4)





Panic attacks 1 (0.9)
Diagnosis on assessment in UK
(ICD^10 code)
Adjustment disorder (F43.2) 59 (50.8)
No psychiatric diagnosis (Z04.6)4 35 (30.2)
Acute stress reaction (F43.0) 8 (6.9)
Mild depressive episode (F32.0) 7 (6.0)
Dysthymia (F34.1) 2 (1.7)
Alcohol dependence (F10.2) 1 (0.9)
Acute psychotic disorder (F23.0) 1 (0.9)
Mania with psychotic symptoms
(F30.2)
1 (0.9)
Panic disorder (F41.0) 1 (0.9)
Phobic anxiety disorder (F41.9) 1 (0.9)
1. Difficulty coping with the physical environment.
2. Separation from close family members, spouse or
partner.
3. Problems with peers or superiors.
4. General psychiatric examination at request of
authority (Armed Forces).
TURNER ET AL
these groups typically present with a range
of less dramatic symptoms that are charac-
teristic of adjustment disorders and almost
invariably including low mood. They are,
incidentally, not dissimilar to those seen in
military personnel during peacetime (Neal
et al, 2003). As with combat stress reaction,
the symptoms in question are situational,
but since separation from family and
friends – not combat – is the most signifi-
cant aetiological variable, the clinical
picture has been described as ‘homesick-
ness’ or ‘nostalgia’ (Jones, 1995). Other
important aetiological variables include
difficulty coping with the physical environ-
ment. Our findings that those evacuated
were mainly from support units and had
difficulty coping with separation and the
environment suggest that most psychiatric
casualties from Iraq were broadly of this
‘nostalgic’ type. However, what about our
finding that the rate of psychiatric casual-
ties dramatically decreased after the war
ended? This appears to suggest that, con-
trary to what troops themselves reported,
fear of becoming a casualty was the pri-
mary cause of symptoms. This possibility
is supported by the fact that in recent
large-scale military exercises abroad there
were relatively few psychiatric casualties,
and also by our finding that most psychi-
atric symptoms had resolved by the time
of arrival in the UK. In order to explain
the inconsistency between presenting
complaints and reduction in evacuations
after the war ended, we need to consider
that support troops may not be cognizant
that fear is the ultimate cause of their symp-
toms, and even when they are, they may
find it difficult to admit to this when they
are not literally in the firing line. It is a fact
that in modern conflict the physical casual-
ties are often not from the elite units doing´
most of the fighting, because poorly
equipped armies prefer ‘soft’ targets.
Increasingly, therefore, it is deployment to
a war zone itself, and not just combat, that
puts troops at risk.
Predisposition: battle, military unit
and personal characteristics
In a sense, then, modern conflicts such as
the war in Iraq seem to blur the traditional
distinctions between combat and support
troops, and therefore between combat
stress reaction and nostalgia. In view of
this, perhaps we ought to accept a broader
definition of combat stress reaction in order
to accommodate the way in which modern
conflict exposes different types of troops to
similar stresses. We know a reasonable
amount about the aetiology of this dis-
order, and this approach may provide us
with a means of modelling vulnerability in
military personnel that allows us to explain
some of our findings. We know, for exam-
ple, that the incidence of combat stress
reaction increases with battle intensity as
measured by the number of physical casual-
ties, but is modified by a range of factors
related to the battle, the military unit and
the individual. More specifically, the inci-
dence of combat stress reaction increases if:
(a) the battle is protracted, especially if it
ends in defeat;
(b) the battle involves air attack, artillery,
ambush, or attack by civilians or from
civilian homes;
(c) there is tough enemy resistance;
(d) the troops have poor tactical or logis-
tical support (Noy et al, 1987).
The incidence of this condition also
increases if unit morale is poor (which it
is in units that are not cohesive and lack
confidence in their skills), if equipment
and leadership are poor, and if the legiti-
macy of the conflict in which troops are
fighting is in question (Belenky et al,
1987). Lastly, not all military personnel
carry the same risk of developing combat
stress reaction: Reserve service, older age,
low educational level, low rank and low
combat suitability are all associated with
an increased risk (Solomon et al, 1987a).
If we now apply these findings to military
personnel in general we can predict that,
whatever the context, troops from the least
elite units, especially those who are older´
and in Reserve service, will be the first to
present with psychiatric difficulties. This




Knowledge of the aetiology of combat
stress reaction can therefore be generalised
to help us to understand the causes of the
psychiatric evacuations from Iraq. How-
ever, this is where the analogies between
combat stress reaction and nostalgia end.
Whether or not the person has been
exposed to formal combat is fundamental
to treatment and prognosis and to prevent-
ing the kind of aetiological misattributions
referred to in our introduction. Traditional
‘forward psychiatry’ treats combat stress
reaction by returning troops to combat in
order to preclude the detrimental psycho-
social consequences of psychiatric evacu-
ation (Jones & Wessely, 2003). Such
consequences include a damaged military
identity and long-term mental health
problems. However, when troops develop
psychiatric difficulties under what, by mili-
tary standards, is not extreme stress, the
question of retaining them in theatre
becomes more problematic. This is because,
as our findings suggest, longer-term mental
health problems and a relatively poor mili-
tary identity are a cause and not a conse-
quence of military personnel failing to
cope. To continue to expose such individ-
uals to stresses that exacerbate their
immediate symptoms, without the prospect
of a longer-term advantage, is not only
questionable from an ethical perspective,
but it imposes an enormous and unneces-
sary administrative burden on unit com-
manders. The majority of troops who
have psychiatric difficulties without being
exposed to combat are simply unsuitable
for deployment, and once this is recognised
it is entirely appropriate that, as with the
psychiatric casualties from Iraq, they are
repatriated. Indeed, in terms of screening
out vulnerable troops in order to reduce
longer-term psychological morbidity in
veterans, although there is no instrument
that can be used to predict which troops
will develop combat stress reaction (Jones
et al, 2003), it may not be difficult to
predict which troops will develop non-
combat-related psychiatric difficulties dur-
ing deployment. Given the aforementioned
similarities between psychiatric presenta-
tions in combat operation support troops
and those in military personnel during
peacetime, generally speaking it will be
those who have already suffered from a
psychiatric illness and/or those who show
signs of being temperamentally unsuited
to all forms of military service (Turner &
Neal, 2004).
Veterans’ mental health: neuroses
and traumatic neuroses
As one would expect, combat stress reac-
tion is a robust predictor of post-conflict
psychological morbidity in veterans. Solomon
et al (1987b), for example, found that 59%
of an Israeli cohort of Lebanon war veter-
ans with this condition developed post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This,
incidentally, is notwithstanding the finding
that in the study in question some 16% of
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veterans without combat stress reaction
developed PTSD and also that some veter-
ans with combat stress reaction fail to
present until their problems have become
chronic. Similarly, one might also reason-
ably expect that non-combat-related
psychiatric presentation predicts long-term
psychological morbidity in veterans. How-
ever, if further research does show this to
be the case, it will almost certainly be for
entirely different reasons, which stand to
be obscured if the aetiological importance
of combat is ignored. Generally speaking,
military personnel who present with non-
combat-related psychiatric difficulties have
not been traumatised. The individuals in
question are psychologically vulnerable
and may be temperamentally unsuited to
military service, have a history of mental
illness, or both. With these characteristics
it is predictable that a good proportion of
them will go on to develop longer-term
mental health problems. Because these
problems are likely to be towards the minor
mental illness/personality-related end of the
spectrum, they will be difficult to define. It
is under these circumstances that misattri-
butions are more likely to take hold and
that pre-existent neurotic difficulties
become misinterpreted as PTSD. The best
way of preventing this (and the associated
detrimental consequences for veterans) is
by refusing to compromise over the
distinction between veterans who have been
traumatised and those who have not.
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& In low-intensitymodern conflicts, psychiatric presentations among troops consist
mainly of adjustment reactions rather than combat stress reactions.
& These adjustment reactionsmay be exacerbated by heightened fear associated
with non-conventional warfare.
& The failure to clearly identify the reasons for repatriation, for both particular
individuals and troops as awhole, will lead to confusion about the aetiology of long-
termmental health problems in veterans.
LIMITATIONS
& The study takes no account of the factors that influencedwhether troops were
repatriated as opposed to treated in theatre.
& No standardised assessmentwas conducted either in Iraq or in the UK.
& A control group from a large-scalemilitary exercise abroadmight have informed
the relationship between difficulty adjusting to deployment and fear of becoming a
casualty.
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